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A relation is transitive if and only if from 
the fact that A has a relation to B, and B 
has a relation C, it necessarily follows that A 
also has a relation to C. As a relation fulfill-
ing this requirement, consider simultaneity 
understood as two events occurring at the 
same time and only at the same time (thus 
this is not a case of mere partial tempo-
ral overlap): If A and B share all the same 
temporal properties, and B and C share 
them too, then it is impossible for A and 
C not to share them too. Accordingly, the 
simultaneity of the time of events is a tran-
sitive relation. On the other hand, “to be 
non-simultaneous (asynchronous)” is not 
a transitive relation because A and C can 
be simultaneous although both of them are 
non-simultaneous with B.
Perceptual simultaneity refers to our 
perception or judgment that two or more 
things are simultaneous (or at least that we 
cannot tell their temporal order). While the 
transitivity of the simultaneity of time of 
events is virtually always accepted, philoso-
pher Kelly (2005) has argued that perceptual 
simultaneity is an intransitive relation. If 
successful, and the conclusions drawn 
from this claim were sound, Kelly’s (2005) 
argument would pose a serious challenge 
to certain theories of consciousness and 
views on neural synchrony (Elliott et al., 
2006). Instead of elaborating on these con-
sequences, and how they follow from the 
possible intransitivity of perceptual sim-
ultaneity, I will argue that the argument 
itself rests on an assumption that requires 
justification. Accordingly, it should remain 
an open question whether perceptual sim-
ultaneity is a transitive or intransitive rela-
tion, and addressing this question would be 
a fruitful empirical endeavor.
Kelly’s argument takes the imprecision of 
perceptual simultaneity as its starting point. 
It is indeed a well-known fact that when two 
stimuli are presented in a short temporal 
asynchrony, we judge them to be simultane-
ous. Depending on the nature of the stimuli, 
this window of simultaneity – temporal 
extension during which we cannot tell the 
temporal order of asynchronous stimuli – 
can range from few milliseconds to tens of 
milliseconds. Based on this imperfection of 
our perceptual processes, Kelly’s argument 
focuses on situations where subjects are 
shown three or more asynchronous stimuli. 
One way to present it goes as follows.
Let us assume that a subject is shown 
three brief asynchronous stimuli (A, B, and 
C) such that the onset asynchrony between 
A and B is three quarters of the temporal 
window of simultaneity, and that this holds 
for B and C too. Accordingly, A and B, and 
B and C are judged to be simultaneous. But 
the onset asynchrony between A and C is 
50% longer than the window of simulta-
neity. Hence, A and C are not perceptu-
ally simultaneous. Given that the relation 
of perceptual simultaneity holds between 
A and B, and between B and C, but not 
between A and C, perceptual simultaneity 
turns out to be an intransitive relation.
To make this more concrete, let us assume 
that the temporal window of simultaneity 
is 40 ms (although the exact number has 
no bearing on the success of the argument, 
this is close the lower limit of the estima-
tions for visual simultaneity threshold). In 
this case A and B, and B and C could be 
presented 30 ms apart, and they are per-
ceptually simultaneous. Nevertheless, A and 
C appear 60 ms apart, which makes them 
perceptually asynchronous.
The previous line of reasoning rests, 
however, on (at least thus far unjustified) 
assumption because the intransitivity of 
perceptual simultaneity does not follow by 
logical necessity from the imperfection of 
our perceptual processes to determine tem-
poral relations between stimuli. To see this, 
consider Kelly’s argument again. In order 
for the argument to get off the ground, 
three comparisons need to be established: 
while we perceive A and B as simultaneous, 
we also perceive B and C as simultaneous 
and A and C as non-simultaneous. For this 
to take place, the argument needs to entail 
that we can successfully make a number 
of simultaneity comparison that cover the 
same episodes of experiencing. If it turned 
out, for example, that the episode of expe-
riencing B cannot be part of two simultane-
ity comparisons, one for A and B and the 
other for B and C, then the simultaneity of 
one of them cannot be established and at 
least one of the premises of the argument 
for intransitivity would lose its grounding. 
Kelly’s argument is therefore based on a 
hidden assumption of parallelity according 
to which two or more simultaneity com-
parisons can partly cover the same moments 
of experiencing. (Because the simultaneity 
comparisons are done based on the infor-
mation still lingering in our consciousness 
rather than, say, based on our memory of 
yesterday’s events, the assumption of paral-
lelity amounts roughly to the idea that we 
can do more than one simultaneity com-
parison before the information disappears.) 
If one holds the assumption opposite to the 
one that Kelly is making – the assumption 
of seriality according to which simultane-
ity comparisons cannot cover the same 
moments of experiencing – then there is 
no argument for the intransitivity.
It thus remains an open question 
whether perceptual simultaneity is tran-
sitive or not. Nevertheless, in addition to 
the general principle that one should not 
adopt any assumptions – especially those 
that may have significant consequences – 
without testing them, two experiments 
suggest that the assumption of parallelity 
along with the intransitivity of perceptual 
simultaneity may not hold. It is worth notic-
ing that the following cases concern only 
visual modalities, and whether they can be 
extended to apply to other sensory modali-
ties as well as to crossmodal simultaneity is 
an open question.
First, the issue whether the visual judg-
ments of simultaneity are transitive or not 
has been explicitly tested by Corwin and 
Boynton (1968). Based on their results, they 
concluded that “[w]ithin the  experimental 
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variability obtained, the transitivity rela-
tion was confirmed” (Corwin and Boynton, 
1968, p. 560). Subsequently, their study pro-
vides support for the assumption of seriality 
and against the assumption of parallelity.
Second, rather than testing transitivity 
directly, one can also wonder what hap-
pens when more than two asynchronous 
stimuli are presented. An indication to 
this can be found from a study done by 
Lichtenstein (1961), where subjects were 
presented flashes in four locations with 
varying asynchronies between them (and 
then the cycle began again). The results 
showed that despite large onset asynchro-
nies (up to 95 ms), all four flashes were 
perceived to be simultaneous. More pre-
cisely, they appeared to pulsate together in 
a manner that “no time difference among 
any of the pulsating dots is discernible” 
(Lichtenstein, 1961, p. 56). That is, adding 
more asynchronous stimuli to the compari-
son appeared to make the temporal window 
of simultaneity considerably wider than it 
is usually for visual stimuli. On the other 
hand, the pulsation of stimuli implies that 
after a critical period of time, one temporal 
window of simultaneity ends and another 
begins – meaning that perceptual contents 
are part of only one perceptual simultaneity 
comparison at a time as suggested by the 
assumption of seriality.
There are thus one explicit and one 
indirect reason to think that the transitiv-
ity and the assumption of seriality might 
be true. Such evidence is hardly conclusive, 
however, and therefore it remains an open 
question whether this is the case or not. 
In addition of merely settling the issue of 
transitivity, addressing this question would 
also be a fruitful way for testing the theo-
retical models of simultaneity judgments 
– something that would be lost if we sim-
ply assumed that perceptual simultaneity 
is transitive or intransitive. This is because 
the models put forward to explain our sim-
ultaneity judgments usually imply that per-
ceptual simultaneity is either a transitive or 
an intransitive relation. Let me finish with 
examples of this.
When thinking about perceptual sim-
ultaneity, some psychologists have pos-
tulated an existence of a comparator that 
compares the arrival times of sensory mes-
sages produced by presented stimuli. It has 
a temporal resolution, a limit below which 
it cannot separate the temporal order of 
the stimuli and if the difference of sen-
sory messages produced by some stimuli 
is below this threshold, the comparator 
regards them as simultaneous. It is worth 
noticing that the idea of comparator can be 
either understood literally (Efron, 1963) or 
merely as a useful theoretical construct to 
account our performance in simultaneity 
judgment tasks (Ulrich, 1987). Thus, even 
if there is no real simultaneity-comparator 
in the brain, the following models can be 
understood as providing different theoreti-
cal accounts of the key factors influencing 
how we come about judging that two stim-
uli are simultaneous.
One example of how this comparator 
could function originates from von Baer 
(1862) and was later revived by Stroud 
(1955). According to this discrete moment 
hypothesis, one temporal window of sim-
ultaneity (one perceptual moment) follows 
another in discrete fashion – when one tem-
poral window ends, another one begins 
immediately. Everything that occurs (or is 
registered) within one perceptual moment 
is considered simultaneous, while every-
thing outside of this perceptual moment is 
non-simultaneous. Because “belonging to 
a single perceptual moment” determines 
the perceptual simultaneity, and this rela-
tion is transitive, on this model perceptual 
simultaneity is also a transitive relation. The 
same also applies to the triggered moment 
hypothesis that resembles Stroud’s proposal 
with the exception that here the compara-
tor begins to do its task only when it has 
been triggered by a stimulus – temporal 
windows of simultaneity do not follow 
each other automatically in the absence 
of stimuli. Lichtenstein’s (1961) results, in 
turn, suggest that the window of simultane-
ity is partly determined by the properties 
of the stimuli. Accordingly, they imply a 
model that is likely to be a version of the 
triggered model hypothesis. Unlike in other 
models discussed here though, the window 
of simultaneity is flexible. Thus it could be 
called triggered flexible moment hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, here 
the perceptual simultaneity is a transitive 
relation. Allport (1968) traveling moment 
hypothesis, on the other hand, maintains 
that there is only one continuously moving 
perceptual moment. Because the perceptual 
moment moves continuously, two different 
perceptual moments can partly cover the 
same episode of experiencing in Allport’s 
model. Consequently, this model is compat-
ible with the assumption of parallelity and 
if it were correct, then perceptual simulta-
neity would turn out to be an intransitive 
relation. At this point it remains an open 
question which one of these models, if any, 
explain the empirical data best. For this 
reason, the issue of transitivity of percep-
tual simultaneity should be taken seriously 
because it would provide an additional way 
to separate these and similar models.
To sum up, all means of “measuring” 
are somewhat imprecise and our ability to 
determine asynchronies is not an exception. 
Accordingly, we can never know whether 
two events occurred exactly at the same 
time or not. Nevertheless, the intransitivity 
of perceptual simultaneity does not follow 
by logical necessity from this imperfection 
because it requires further that the assump-
tion of parallelity is true – that two or more 
simultaneity comparisons can (partly) 
cover the same moments of experiencing. 
Moreover, the two discussed empirical stud-
ies bearing relevance on the matter suggest 
that that perceptual simultaneity may not 
be a transitive relation after all and thus that 
the assumption of parallelity is not true. On 
the other hand, as this evidence is not con-
clusive, conducting more research on the 
topic would be valuable.
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